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ABSTRACT

Under Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank International, when a claim is found directed to a
patent-ineligible subject matter, the claim is still patent-eligible if it includes an
inventive concept. The Federal Circuit’s case law has indicated that an alleged
inventive concept with unconventionality may satisfy step two of the Alice standard.
Specifically, this paper demonstrates that the case law suggests a way to prove such
unconventionality. That is, a patent specification or a patentee’s complaint must
include four topics: (1) prior art technology; (2) how a system executing the claimed
invention performs differently from the prior art technology; (3) the benefits derived
from the claimed unconventional system; and (4) a specific feature operating
differently from the prior art technology. With these factual statements, a patent
may survive a patent-ineligibility challenge in a motion to dismiss.
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FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S UNCONVENTIONALITY APPROACH TO PATENTINELIGIBILITY CHALLENGES IN A MOTION TO DISMISS
PING-HSUN CHEN
I. INTRODUCTION
A patentable invention under 35 U.S.C. § 101 requires the invention to fall
within any category of a “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof[.]”1 The Supreme Court has held that § 101
“contains an important implicit exception [that] ‘[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas’ are not patentable.”2
In 2014, the Supreme Court in Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank International
finalized a two-part inquiry for determining whether a claim is patent-eligible under
§ 101.3 The first step asks “whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those
patent-ineligible concepts.”4 The second step “consider[s] the elements of each claim
both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional
elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.”5
Step two of the Alice standard specifically searches for an inventive concept “—
i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent
in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept]
itself.’”6 While “[p]atent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is an issue of law[,]”7 the step
two analysis “may contain disputes over underlying facts.”8 For example, step two “is
satisfied when the claim limitations involve more than performance of well-understood,
routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the industry.” 9 But,
* © Ping-Hsun Chen, ORCID: 0000-0002-5685-6989. Ping-Hsun Chen is an Associate Professor at the Graduate Institute
of Technology, Innovation and Intellectual Property Management, National Chengchi University, National Chengchi
University, Taiwan. This article is derived from a conference article presented orallyat the 2020 National Technology
Law Conference, National Chiao Tung University. The author thanks the audience for their comments.
1
35 U.S.C. § 101; see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010) (“Section 101 thus specifies four
independent categories of inventions or discoveries that are eligible for protection: processes, machines, manufactures,
and compositions of matter.”).
2
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012).
3
See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014); see also Kevin E. Noonan & Andrew W.
Torrance, Biotechnology Patent Law Top Ten of 2018 Broad Wins, Sovereignty Loses, and Patent Dance, 52 AKRON
L. REV. 637, 650 (2018) (discussing a district court decision that applied the Alice standard).
4
Alice Corp. Pty., 573 U.S. at 217. For computer-implemented inventions, step one may focus on whether a
claim recites an improvement in computer functionality. See Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1304–
06 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The question, then, is whether this behavior-based virus scan in the ’844 patent constitutesan
improvement in computer functionality. We think it does.”).
5
Alice Corp. Pty., 573 U.S. at 217.
6
Id. at 217–18 (emphasis and alteration in original).
7
OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
8
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
9
Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1367 (internal quotation marks omitted and alteration in original); see also BSG Tech
LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290–91 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“If a claim’s only ‘inventive concept’ is the
application of an abstract idea using conventional and well-understood techniques, the claim has not been transformed
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“whether a claim element or combination of elements is well-understood, routine and
conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact.”10
Before Alice Corp. Pty., it was not required to specifically show any inventive
concept of the claimed invention to pass the patent-eligibility test.11 The machine-ortransformation test (“MOT”) guided practitioners to carefully draft a process claim that
avoids finding of patent-ineligibility.12 The MOT is a two-part inquiry.13 First, “an
applicant may show that a process claim satisfies § 101 either by showing that his
claim is tied to a particular machine, or by showing that his claim transforms an
article.”14 Second, “the involvement of the machine or transformation in the claimed
process must not merely be an insignificant extra-solution activity.”15 For example, a
claim with a patent-ineligible process may become patent-eligible if it recites a
structure in a form of claim limitations that can perform the functions of the structure,
while the claim limitations should not comprise of language merely repeating an
intended use of the claimed process nor amounting to extra-solution activity.16
After Alice Corp. Pty., even a system claim may not survive a patentineligibility challenge.17 The Alice standard creates an inventor-unfriendly standard
for determining what an inventive concept is.18 Professor Andres Sawicki has criticized that
“the ‘inventive concept’ demands that the inventor point to something unusual or
into a patent-eligible application of an abstract idea.”) (emphasis added). In Mayo Collaborative Servs., the Supreme
Court held that “the steps in the claimed processes (apart from the natural laws themselves) involve well-understood,
routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field.” 566 U.S. at 73. In Alice Corp. Pty.,
when considering the claim elements separately under step two, the Supreme Court criticized that “the function
performed by the computer at each step of the process is ‘[p]urely conventional.’” 573 U.S. at 225 (alteration in
original and emphasis added). Additionally, the Court noted that “the use of a computer to obtain data, adjust account
balances, and issue automated instructions; all of these computer functions are ‘well-understood, routine, conventional
activit[ies]’ previously known to the industry.” Id. (alteration in original and emphasis added) (citing Mayo
Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 73).
10
Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368. Contrarily, “[t]he analysis under Alice step one is whether the claims as a whole
are ‘directed to’ an abstract idea, regardless of whether the prior art demonstrates that the idea or other aspects of the
claim are known, unknown, conventional, unconventional, routine, or not routine.” CardioNet, L.L.C. v. InfoBionic,
Inc., 955 F.3d 1358, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
11
See Timothy J. Busse, The Relativity of an Abstract Idea: A Practicable Approach to Alice’s Inventive
Concept, 16 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 252, 265–66 (2016) (“At Mayo step two, the Court manipulated the precedent
set forth in Mayo, Benson, Flook, and Diehr to expound upon the ‘inventive concept’ standard.”).
12
See Robert A. King, Developing a Successful Intellectual Property Program, 2011 WL 1120279, at *3
(Aspatore 2011) (“The machine or transformation test represents a ‘safe harbor’ for claim drafting. Many patent
practitioners draft claims to meet this test, and, in many cases, starting with the minimum amount of machine-related
references in the claims.”); Peter Ludwig, Machine-or-Transformation Test Hits the Board: Patent-Eligible Subject
Matter Following Bilski, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 139, 141–55 (2010); Ping-Hsun Chen, PatentEligibility Standard for Network Architecture Patents Under the Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence, 36 SANTA CLARA
HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 10 (2019) (addressing that the Federal Circuit has abrogated the MOT test).
13
See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
14
Id.
15
Id. at 962; see also Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Reyna,
J., dissenting) (“[E]xtra-solution activity, by definition, describes activity unrelated to how the solution is achieved.”).
16
See Bradley D. Blanche, The Unintended Effects of Bilski on the Patentability of Software and ComputerRelated Invention, 2009 WL 2510888, at *8 (Aspatore 2009).
17
See Ping-Hsun Chen, Patent Eligibility of Online Application Software After Internet Patents Corp. v. Active
Network, Inc., 99 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 97, 105-06, 108–10 (2017) (discussing the patent-ineligibility
issue concerning recitation of a computer).
18
See Andres Sawicki, The Central Claiming Renaissance, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 645, 664–68 (2018)
(addressing the issues of the Alice standard).
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surprising in her application of the prohibited subject matter.”19 Unfortunately, the
need to present any unusual or surprising feature is urged during the early stage of
patent litigation, because an issue of patent-ineligibility can be brought in a motion to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6).20 A patentee is often
forbidden from going through claim construction to define the claimed invention.21
In Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc.,22 the Federal Circuit vacated the district
court’s motion to dismiss because the district court failed to acknowledge the patentee’s
factual allegations in the complaint concerning the patent-eligibility issue of the
disputed claims.23 The district court required the patentee to cite the specification to
support that the claimed inventive concept was unconventional, but the Federal
Circuit considered the district court’s approach as misreading its case law. 24 The
Federal Circuit restated that a district court must take allegations in the complaint as
true.25 Eventually, the Federal Circuit concluded that the patentee “made specific,
plausible factual allegations about why aspects of its claimed inventions were not
conventional”26 and held that the disputed claims included an inventive concept.27
The question arising from Cellspin Soft, Inc. is how to successfully allege that
the claim has unconventionality to survive a motion to dismiss. In fact, the Federal
Circuit’s case law may have shown that unconventionality of an invention may be a
key for such an invention to survive a patent-ineligibility challenge under step two.28
19

Id. at 667.
See Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“We have repeatedly
recognized that in many cases it is possible and proper to determine patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion.”); see also Rebecca Lindhorst, Note, Two-Stepping Through Alice’s Wasteland of Patent-Eligible
Subject Matter: Why the Supreme Court Should Replace the Mayo/Alice Test, 69 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 752
(2019) (discussing determination of patent-eligibility on a motion to dismiss); Robert Daniel Garza, Software Patents
and Pretrial Dismissal Based on Ineligibility, 24 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 56–63 (2018) (discussing patent-ineligibilitybased dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) & Rule 12(c)).
21
See, e.g., Genetic Techs. Ltd., 818 F.3d at 1374 (“In many cases, too, evaluation of a patent claim’s subject
matter eligibility under § 101 can proceed even before a formal claim construction.”); Content Extraction &
Transmission L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Although the
determination of patent eligibility requires a full understanding of the basic character of the claimed subject matter,
claim construction is not an inviolable prerequisite to a validity determination under § 101.”); cf. Bancorp Servs.,
L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1273–74 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[I]t will ordinarily be
desirable—and often necessary—to resolve claim construction disputes prior to a § 101 analysis, for the determination
of patent eligibility requires a full understanding of the basic character of the claimed subject matter.”); CG Tech.
Dev., L.L.C. v. William Hill U.S. Holdco, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 3d 842, 851 (D. Del. 2019) (“Therefore, I will not
complete the § 101 analysis until I construe ‘reliability information.’ Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on § 101
is denied.”); RideApp, Inc. v. Lyft, Inc., No. 18-CV-07152-JST, 2019 WL 7834759, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2019)
(“The Court will defer ruling on § 101 patent eligibility until after it has construed the claims, including determining
whether any of the claims are indefinite.”).
22
Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 927 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
23
See John C. Gatz, Decisions in Brief, 12 LANDSLIDE 56, 58 (A.B.A. 2019).
24
See Jasper L. Tran & J. Sean Benevento, Alice at Five, 2019 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 25, 90 (2019) (analyzing
Cellspin Soft, Inc.).
25
See Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1317–18.
26
Id. (emphasis added).
27
Id. at 1318.
28
See, e.g., Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., 827 F.3d 1341, 1349-52 (Fed. Cir.
2016); Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1299-1306 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Aatrix Software, Inc.
v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1129-30 (Fed. Cir. 2018); ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc.,
920 F.3d 759, 773-75 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. ADP, L.L.C., 772 F. App’x 890, 898-902 (Fed. Cir.
20
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Therefore, this article explores a line of cases where the Federal Circuit’s patenteligibility determination depends on whether the alleged inventive concept was
unconventional. Particularly, this article attempts to determine whether this
unconventionality approach to patent-eligibility is a stable methodology and whether
the Federal Circuit has established a bright line between patent-eligible and patentineligible subject matters for Internet-implemented inventions. Next, Part II discusses
the review standard of a patent-ineligibility issue in a motion to dismiss. Part III
analyzes a series of cases where the Federal Circuit looked for the unconventional
nature of a claimed invention when determining whether the claimed invention
contains an inventive concept. Finally, Part IV illustrates the nature of the Federal
Circuit’s unconventionality approach.
II. RULE 12(B)(6) AND PATENT-INELIGIBILITY ISSUE
Rule 8(a)(2) requires a plaintiff’s complaint to contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”29 On the other
hand, Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to assert by motion a defense based on a
plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”30 If a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion is granted, a complaint will be dismissed.31 But, a court may grant a plaintiff’s
motion for leave to amend, so the plaintiff can provide sufficient factual allegations in
a new complaint to survive another Rule 12(b)(6) motion.32
In considering whether to grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts
accept “as true the complaint’s factual allegations and constru[e] them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.”33 But, the district court in Cellspin Soft, Inc. deviated from
that standard by requiring a patentee to cite the specification to support factual
allegations.34
U.S. Patent Nos. 8,738,794 (“’794 Patent”), 8,892,752 (“’752 Patent”), 9,258,698
(“’698 Patent”), and 9,749,847 (“’847 Patent”) were four asserted patents in Cellspin
Soft, Inc.35 The district court found the disputed claims directed to an abstract idea of
“a method of acquiring, transferring, and publishing data and multimedia content on

2019); Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 927 F.3d 1306, 1316-19 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Bridge & Post, Inc. v. Verizon
Commc’ns, Inc., 778 F. App’x 882, 884 (Fed. Cir. 2019); see generally Matthew B. Hershkowitz, Note, Patently
Insane for Patents: A Judge-by-Judge Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Post-Alice Patentable Subject Matter
Eligibility of Abstract Ideas Jurisprudence, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 109, 133-67 (2017)
(observing that different judges take different approaches to applying the Alice standard and, specifically under Alice
step two, some judges consider whether the claimed components or steps were generic or conventional).
29
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
30
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
31
See Rao v. BP Prod. N. Am., Inc., No. 04 C 6040, 2006 WL 8440359, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2006).
32
See, e.g., Young v. Everhome Mortg., No. CIV 12-14738, 2013 WL 2395171, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 31,
2013).
33
Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 890 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J.,
concurring) (per curiam) (applying the Eleventh Circuit’s case law); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”).
34
See Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1313.
35
Id. at 1309.
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one or more websites,”36 and did not contain an inventive concept.37
In its decision, the district court mainly focused on the ’794 Patent and briefly
addressed the patent-ineligibility issues of the other three patents. 38 Regarding the
’794 Patent, the district court first opined that the components recited in the disputed
claims behave in their expected, ordinary functions.39 In addition, the district court
criticized that the disputed claims were merely “set in a ‘technological environment’
consisting of conventional components and utiliz[ing] standard technology,”40 such that
“such invocations of computers and networks that are not even arguabl[y] inventive are
insufficient to pass the test of an inventive concept.”41
In responding to the patentee’s six arguments stating the benefits gained from
the inventiveness of the claimed invention, the district court found them unpersuasive.
42 The district court acknowledged that the specification of the ’794 Patent supported
the first benefit, i.e., the efficiencies of the claimed inventions,43 butit concluded that
“a method which utilizes known and conventional computer components to achieve an
improvement in the efficiency or speed of a previously- manual process does not
constitute a sufficient inventive concept.”44 As for the five other alleged benefits, the
district court rejected all of them, because the patentee failed to cite the specification
to support these allegations.45
Furthermore, the district court criticized that the patentee’s amended
complaint had the same flaws.46 The district court noted that the patentee’s allegations
concerning technological improvements were not based on the specification. 47
Regarding those specification-related allegations, the district court disagreed that the
cited portions of the specification actually support the relevant allegations.48
Finally, regarding the ’752 Patent, ’698 Patent, and ’847 Patent, the district
court opined that the patentee failed to allege how each patent was sufficiently
different from the ’794 Patent to acquire any inventive concept. 49 Therefore, the
district court found all disputed claims patent-eligible.50
On appeal, the Federal Circuit disapproved of the district court’s approach and
illustrated why the district court applied an incorrect standard for reviewing a patentineligibility issue on a motion to dismiss. 51 That is, the district court erred in
discounting the allegations in the patentee’s amended complaint because of the

36

Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 3d 1138, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
Id. at 1152, 1155.
38
Id. at 1152–55.
39
Id. at 1152.
40
Id. (citing Intellectual Ventures I L.L.C. v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
41
Cellspin Soft, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 3d at 1153 (citing Elec. Power Grp., L.L.C. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350,1355–
56 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. (citing OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
45
Id. at 1153–54.
46
Cellspin Soft, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 3d at 1154.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 1155.
50
Id.
51
See Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1316–18.
37
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patentee’s failure to cite the specification to support the allegations.52
The Federal Circuit started with its precedent, Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green
Shades Software, Inc.,53 and concluded that it “repeatedly cited allegations in the
complaint to conclude that the disputed claims were potentially inventive.” 54 In
addition, the Federal Circuit derived from Aatrix Software, Inc. two legal
propositions.55 First, while it is not “to say that any allegation about inventiveness,
wholly divorced from the claims or the specification, defeats a motion to dismiss,
plausible and specific factual allegations that aspects of the claims are inventive are
sufficient.” Second, “[a]s long as what makes the claims inventive is recited by the
claims, the specification need not expressly list all the reasons why this claimed
structure is unconventional.”56 Under these principles, the Federal Circuit held that
the patentee’s complaint successfully “made specific, plausible factual allegations
about why aspects of its claimed inventions were not conventional[.]” 57 In addition, the
Federal Circuit criticized that “[t]he district court erred by not accepting those
allegations as true.”58
Secondly, the Federal Circuit discussed why the district court misapplied
Berkheimer v. HP Inc.59 to support the denial of the patentee’s allegations.60 Among
other things, the district court held that the disputed patent in Berkheimer described
an inventive feature “in a purportedly unconventional manner[,]” whereas the
patentee here failed to “identify any portion of the specification which describes the
purportedly inventive [features or benefits.]”61 But, the Federal Circuit opined that the
district court’s view on Berkheimer did not comply with Aatrix Software, Inc.,62 because
under Aatrix Software, Inc., “patentees who adequately allege their claims contain
inventive concepts survive a § 101 eligibility analysis under Rule 12(b)(6).”63 Finally,
the Federal Circuit reaffirmed a “principle, implicit in Berkheimer and explicit in
Aatrix, that factual disputes about whether an aspect of the claims is inventive may
preclude dismissal at the pleadings stage under § 101.”64
Lastly, the Federal Circuit pointed to Bascom Global Internet Services, Inc. v.
AT&T Mobility L.L.C.65 and emphasized that “the ‘limited record’ [in Bascom] did not

52

See id. at 1317–18.
Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
54
Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1317 (emphasis in original) (citing Aatrix Software, Inc., 882 F.3d at 1128).
55
See id. at 1317–18.
56
Id. at 1317.
57
Id. at 1317–18.
58
Id. at 1318.
59
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
60
See Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1318. Originally, the patentee used Berkheimer to argue that the defendant’s
motion to dismiss should be denied because “the question of whether a claim element or combination of elements is
well-understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field . . . must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.” Cellspin Soft, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 3d at 1154, n.12. But, the district court disagreed. See Cellspin
Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1313.
61
Cellspin Soft, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 3d at 1154, n.12; see Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1313.
62
Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1318.
63
Id. (quoting Aatrix Software, Inc., 882 F.3d at 1126–27).
64
Id.; see also Simio, L.L.C. v. FlexSim Software Prod., Inc., No. 2:18-CV-00853, 2019 WL 5423609, at *3 (D.
Utah Oct. 23, 2019) (“Cellspin merely reiterates established principles from Berkheimer and Aatrix that ‘plausibleand
specific factual allegations that aspects of the claims are inventive are sufficient’ at the pleading stage[.]”).
65
Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
53
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demonstrate that the [claimed inventive step] ‘had been conventional or generic.’”66
Likewise, the Federal Circuit applied the correct standard and further held that “[o]n
the limited record here, and at this stage in the case, we reach the same result with
respect to the elements recited by the asserted claims.”67 Because the patentee had
successfully alleged the inventive concept, the Federal Circuit stated that it “ha[d] no
basis, at the pleadings stage, to say that these claimed techniques, among others, were
well-known or conventional as a matter of law.”68 Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded
that the asserted claims here did not lack an inventive concept when it accepted the
patentee’s allegations as true.69
After Cellspin Soft, Inc., it is clear that courts cannot disregard what is stated
in a complaint concerning the patent-eligible nature of a claimed invention.70 However,
the Federal Circuit has allowed courts not to “‘accept as true allegations that contradict
matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit,’ such as the claims and the
patent specification.”71 For example, in Secured Mail Solutions L.L.C. v. Universal
Wilde, Inc., the Federal Circuit denied the claimed inventive concept, because many of
the technologies the claimed inventive concept relied upon were well-known and could
be discerned from the disputed patents themselves.72 In addition, some district courts
have rejected “conclusory or generalized statements, and fanciful or exaggerated
allegations,”73 or “non-specific, conclusory allegations of inventiveness divorced from
the claims and specification[.]”74 One district court in Utah even stated that Cellspin
Soft, Inc. “does not mean that ‘any allegation about inventiveness . . . defeats a motion
to dismiss.’”75
Nonetheless, Cellspin Soft, Inc. provided a way to allege “[a]n inventive concept
[that] reflects something more than the application of an abstract idea using ‘well66

Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1318 (citing Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc., 827 F.3d at 1350).
Id. (emphasis added).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
See, e.g., Pebble Tide L.L.C. v. Arlo Techs., No. CV 18-1767-LPS, 2020 WL 509183, *4 (D. Del. Jan. 31,
2020) (“So any purported failure of the specification here to affirmatively disclose how unconventional the ordered
combination is, is not fatal to the plaintiff's claims.”); Stormborn Techs., L.L.C. v. Topcon Positioning Sys., Inc., 444
F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (“Although these benefits over prior art are not clearly stated in the
specification, the Federal Circuit has ‘repeatedly cited allegations in the complaint to conclude that the disputed claims
were potentially inventive.’” (emphasis in original)). Cf. Cellwitch Inc. v. Tile, Inc., No. 4:19-cv-01315-JSW, 2019
WL 10734767, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2019) (“While the court stated that it relied on allegations in the complaint
to find a claim inventive, the Federal Circuit stressed that any allegation about inventiveness, completely separate
from the claims or specification, would not defeat a motion to dismiss.”).
71
Secured Mail Sols. L.L.C. v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 905, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Anderson v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 570 F. App’x 927, 931 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
72
See id. at 912.
73
Yanbin Yu v. Apple Inc., 392 F. Supp. 3d 1096, 1102 (N.D. Cal. 2019); see Hybrid Audio, L.L.C. v. Asus
Computer Int’l, No. 3:17-CV-05947-JD, 2019 WL 3037540, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2019); Thompson v. TCT
Mobile, Inc., No. CV 19-899-RGA-SRF, 2020 WL 1531333, at *10 (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2020) (“But such conclusory
descriptions are not ‘plausible and specific factual allegations’ that the user interface is inventive sufficient to survive
step two.”); Rothschild Digital Confirmation, L.L.C. v. Skedulo Holdings Inc., No. 3:19-CV-02659-JD, 2020 WL
1307016, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2020) (“Even so, a patentee cannot avoid dismissal for ineligible claims purely on
the basis of conclusory or generalized factual allegations.”).
74
Data Scape Ltd. v. Spotify USA Inc., No. CV 19-4367 PSG (SKx), 2019 WL 7905735, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
22, 2019).
75
Simio, L.L.C. v. FlexSim Software Prod., Inc., No. 2:18-CV-00853, 2019 WL 5423609, at *3 (D. Utah Oct.
23, 2019).
67
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understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry[,]’”76
as the Federal Circuit opined that the patentee had “made specific, plausible factual
allegations about why aspects of its claimed inventions were not conventional[.]” 77 This
approach looking for unconventional features of an invention is not new as this article
will address in Part III. But, Cellspin Soft, Inc. along with Aatrix Software, Inc.may
clarify what constitutes unconventionality of an invention.78
III. FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S CASES APPLYING THE UNCONVENTIONALITY APPROACH
A. Bascom Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C.
In Bascom Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., the Federal
Circuit affirmed that the new patent-eligibility standard considers “whether various
claim elements simply recite ‘well-understood, routine, conventional activit[ies].’” 79
However, the Federal Circuit began to acknowledge that “an inventive concept can be
found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional
pieces.”80 In Bascom Global Internet Services, Inc., the disputed patent was U.S. Patent
No. 5,987,606 (“’606 Patent”) entitled “Method and System for Content Filtering
Information Retrieved from an Internet Computer Network.” 81 The district court
dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), finding the asserted claims patentineligible.82 On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the disputed claims passed step
two of the Alice standard.83
The patented technology was filtering software attempting to prevent a
computer user from accessing certain websites without being bypassed by such user.84
It utilized certain communication networks to implement individually customizable
filtering at a remote ISP (Internet service provider) server. 85 These networks are
composed of remote ISP servers and user computers.86 Before browsing websites, a user
is required to first log into an ISP server that then identifies the user’s filtering
profile.87 Then, when the user accesses a specific website from their computer, the ISP
server will check whether visiting such website is allowable according the user’s

76

Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1316 (quoting Aatrix Software, Inc., 882 F.3d at 1128).
Id. at 1317–18.
78
See infra Part IV.A.
79
Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (alteration
in original) (quoting Alice Corp. Pty., 573 U.S. at 225).
80
Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc., 827 F.3d at 1350 (emphasis added); see also Kurt Prange, Blockchain &
Business Methods: How Business Method Patents May Be Redeemed by Furthering Blockchain Innovation, 18 COLO.
TECH. L.J. 185, 200 (2020) (discussing Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc.).
81
Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc., 827 F.3d at 1343.
82
Id. at 1346.
83
See id. at 1349–52.
84
Id. at 1343–44.
85
Id. at 1344.
86
Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc., 827 F.3d at 1344–45.
87
Id.
77
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filtering profile.88
The disputed claims of the ’606 Patent were categorized into two groups.89 The
first group focused on “individual-customizable filtering on a remote ISP server[.]”90
The second group related to “a hybrid filtering scheme implemented on the ISP
server[.]”91 The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that “the limitations of
the claims, taken individually, recite generic computer, network and Internet
components, none of which is inventive by itself[,]” but disagreed with the district
court’s step two analysis of the ordered combination of limitations. 92 The Federal
Circuit acknowledged that “local computers, ISP servers, networks, network accounts,
or filtering” were neither invented by the patentee nor described as inventive in the
specification.93 However, the Federal Circuit found the present case was where “an
inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement
of known, conventional pieces.”94
The Federal Circuit recognized the inventive concept as “the installation of a
filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end-users, with customizable
filtering features specific to each end user.”95 According to the patentee, the inventive
concept relied on some ISP servers capable of “identify[ing] individual accounts that
communicate with the ISP server” and “associat[ing] a request for Internet content
with a specific individual account.”96 Additionally, the claimed inventive concept was
implemented by “associating individual accounts with their own filtering scheme and
elements while locating the filtering system on an ISP server.”97 Consequently, the
claimed invention allegedly embraced “both the benefits of a filter on a local computer
88

See id. at 1345.
See id.
90
Id. For instance, claim 1 recited “a content filtering system for filtering content retrieved from an Internet
computer network by individual controlled access network accounts” with a key limitation:
89

a remote ISP server coupled to said client computer and said Internet computer network, said ISP
server associating each said network account to at least one filtering scheme and at least one set of
filtering elements, said ISP server further receiving said network access requests from said client
computer and executing said associated filtering scheme utilizing said associated set of logical
filtering elements.
Id.
Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc., 827 F.3d at 1345. For example, claim 23 recited “an ISP server for filtering
content forwarded to controlled access network account generating network access requests at a remote client
computer, each network access request including a destination address field.” Id. But, claim 23 dependent on claim
22 (an independent claim), see id., and covered a key limitation:
91

a plurality of inclusive-lists of allowed sites, each controlled access user associated with at least
one of said plurality of inclusive-lists of allowed sites, said filtering program further allowing said
network access request if said requested destination address exists on said at least one associated
inclusive-list.
Id. at 1346.
92
Id. at 1349.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 1350.
95
Id.
96
Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc., 827 F.3d at 1350.
97
Id.
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and the benefits of a filter on the ISP server.”98
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit opined that “[o]n this limited record, this
specific method of filtering Internet content cannot be said, as a matter of law, to have
been conventional or generic.”99 However, the Federal Circuit did not address what
constitutes the unconventional features of the alleged inventive concept.100 Rather, the
Federal Circuit focused on whether the disputed claims “recite a specific, discrete
implementation of the abstract idea of filtering content” without preempting all ways
of Internet content-filtering.101 The Federal Circuit noted that the disputed patent
“describes how its particular arrangement of elements is a technical improvement over
prior art ways of filtering [unwanted] content.”102 In addition, the Federal Circuit
recognized the disputed patent as “claiming a technology-based solution (not an
abstract-idea-based solution implemented with generic technical components in a
conventional way)[.]” 103 Moreover, the Federal Circuit distinguished the disputed
claims from claims “without providing a specific technical solution beyond simply using
generic computer concepts in a conventional way.”104 That is, the Federal Circuit found
that the disputed claims “carve[d] out a specific location for the filtering system (a
remote ISP server) [that gives] users the ability to customize filtering for their
individual network accounts.”105
B. Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc.
In Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., while applying the Alice
standard by “examin[ing] earlier cases in which a similar or parallel descriptive nature
can be seen—what prior cases were about, and which way they were decided[,]”106 the
Federal Circuit affirmed that a claim may “recite a sufficient inventive concept under
step two—particularly when the claims solve a technology-based problem, even with
conventional, generic components, combined in an unconventional manner.” 107 In
Amdocs (Israel) Ltd., four patents were involved: U.S. Patents Nos. 7,631,065 (“’065
Patent”), 7,412,510 (“’510 Patent”), 6,947,984 (“’984 Patent”), and 6,836,797 (“’797
Patent”), all originating from U.S. Patent No. 6,418,467.108 The district court granted
the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) because the
disputed claims were found patent-ineligible.109 However, the Federal Circuit vacated
the district court’s judgment.110
The patented technology provided a system that helps network service
98

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
100
See id.at 135–52.
101
Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc., 827 F.3d at 1350 (emphasis added).
102
Id. (emphasis added).
103
Id. at 1351.
104
Id. at 1352 (emphasis added).
105
Id. (emphasis added).
106
Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
107
Id. at 1300 (emphasis added) (citing DDR Holdings, L.L.C. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256–59
(Fed. Cir. 2014); Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc., 827 F.3d at 1349–52).
108
Id. at 1290–91.
109
Id. at 1290.
110
Id. at 1307.
99
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providers “account for and bill for internet protocol (‘IP’) network communications.”111
The ’065 Patent’s specification described prior art systems “that stored information in
one location, which made it difficult to keep up with massive record flows from the
network devices and which required huge databases.” 112 To solve the problem, the
claimed system utilized network devices, information source modules (“ISMs”),
gatherers, a central event manager (“CEM”), a central database, a user interface server,
and terminals or clients operated in a distributed manner.113 Under the distributed
manner, “the network usage records are processed close to their sources before being
transmitted to a centralized manager.” 114 The advantage was minimization of the
data-load impact on network and system resources.115 Specifically, the claimed system
included “distributed gathering, filtering, and enhancements that enable load
distribution” and then “allow data to reside close to the information sources[.]” 116
Therefore, the claimed system could “reduc[e] congestion in network bottlenecks, while
still allowing data to be accessible from a central location.”117
Four disputed patents protected the patented technology in different
aspects.118 The ’065 Patent focused on “merging data in a network-based filtering and
aggregating platform” and “enhancing networking accounting data records.” 119 The
’510 Patent concerned “reporting on the collection of network usage information.”120
The ’984 Patent related to “reporting on the collection of network usage information
from a plurality of network devices.”121 Finally, the ’797 Patent involved “generating a
single record reflecting multiple services for accounting purposes.”122
All these representative claims included limitations relying on a distributed
architecture that the Federal Circuit considered to support the patent-eligibility of the
disputed claims. 123 For instance, claim 1 of the ’065 Patent recited a limitation
“computer code for using the accounting information with which the first network
accounting record is correlated to enhance the first network accounting record” (the
enhancing limitation).124 The term “enhance” was construed to mean: “apply a number
of field enhancements in a distributed fashion.”125 Thus, the Federal Circuit opined
that the enhancing limitation was an inventive concept because of its dependency on
111

Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd., 841 F.3d at 1291.
Id. at 1292 (emphasis added) (citing U.S. Patent No. 7,631,065 col.4, ll.39–42 (filed Dec. 7, 2001)).
113
See id. at 1291–92.
114
Id. at 1300.
115
Id. at 1291.
116
Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd., 841 F.3d at 1291–92.
117
Id. at 1292.
118
See id. at 1291.
119
Id. Claim 1 of the ’065 Patent was representative and recited “a computer program product embodied on a
computer readable storage medium for processing network accounting information.” Id.at 1299.
120
Id. at 1291. The representative claim of the ’510 Patent was claim 16 reciting “a computer program product
stored in a computer readable medium for reporting on a collection of network usage information from a plurality of
network devices.” Id. at 1302.
121
Amdocs (Isr.), Ltd, 841 F.3d at 1291. Claim 1 of the ’984 Patent was representative and recited “a method
for reporting on the collection of network usage information from a plurality of network devices.” Id. at 1304.
122
Id. at 1291. Claim 1 of the ’797 Patent was a representative claim reciting “a method for generating a single
record reflecting multiple services for accounting purposes.” Id. at 1305.
123
See id. at 1299–306.
124
Id. at 1300 (emphasis added).
125
Id. (quoting Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 761 F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
112
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the invention’s distributed architecture.126
The Federal Circuit also relied on a portion of the specification of the ’065
Patent and found that “this distributed enhancement is a critical advancement over
the prior art[.]” 127 Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that claim 1 “entails an
unconventional technological solution (enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a
technological problem (massive record flows which previously required massive
databases).” 128 Moreover, the Federal Circuit noted that the enhancing limitation
needs those arguably generic components (e.g., network devices and gatherers) to
“operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer
functionality.”129
However, the Federal Circuit did not describe a standard for determining
“unconventionality.” 130 Rather, the Federal Circuit looked to some technological
solution to a technological problem or some technical improvement over prior art
technologies.131 Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit’s reasoning may imply the nature of
“unconventionality.”132 For instance, in concluding claim 1 “entails an unconventional
technological solution[,]” the Federal Circuit specified a portion of the specification
comparing the data flows in the claimed distributed architecture and the prior art
system.133 Hence, “unconventionality” may require identification of what advancement
the claimed inventive concept would provide over prior art technology.
Secondly, in stating that “any and all generic enhancement of data in a similar
system” would not be preempted, the Federal Circuit noted that claim 1 “depends upon
a specific enhancing limitation that necessarily incorporates the invention’s
distributed architecture.” 134 Consequently, the Federal Circuit held that claim 1
“provides the requisite ‘something more’ than the performance of ‘well-understood,
routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the industry.’”135 Therefore,
“unconventionality” may be shown by what specific limitation a claim would include
for executing the claimed inventive concept.
Lastly, the Federal Circuit opined that the benefits of claim 1 “are possible
because of the distributed, remote enhancement that produced an unconventional
result—reduced data flows and the possibility of smaller databases.” 136 Therefore,
evidence showing “unconventionality” may cover what benefit the claimed inventive
concept would offer.
C. Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.
In Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., the Federal Circuit
126

See Amdocs (Isr.), Ltd., 841 F.3d at 1300.
Id. (emphasis added).
128
Id (emphasis added).
129
Id. at 1300–01 (emphasis added).
130
See id. at 1300–02.
131
See Amdocs (Isr.), Ltd., 841 F.3d at 1300–02.
132
See infra Part III.B.
133
Amdocs (Isr.), Ltd., 841 F.3d at 1300 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 7,631,065 col.4 ll.33–42 (filed Dec. 7, 2001)).
134
Id. at 1301 (emphasis added).
135
Id. (alteration in original and emphasis added).
136
Id. at 1302 (emphasis added).
127
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stated that “[i]f the elements involve ‘well-understood, routine, [and] conventional
activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field,’ they do not constitute an
‘inventive concept.’” 137 On the other hand, the Federal Circuit affirmed that “the
second step of the Alice/Mayo test is satisfied when the claim limitations involve more
than performance of well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously
known to the industry.”138 There, the district court found the disputed claims patentineligible, dismissed the case, and rejected the patentee’s motion to leave to amend the
complaint.139 On appeal, the Federal Circuit abrogated the district court’s decision and
specifically found that the proposed complaint, if taken as true, would have proven
patent-eligibility.140
In Aatrix Software, Inc.,there were two asserted patents: U.S. Patents No.
7,171,615 (“’615 Patent”) and 8,984,393 (“’393 Patent”), which share essentially the
same specification. 141 The patented technology involved “systems and methods for
designing, creating, and importing data into a viewable form on a computer so that a
user can manipulate the form data and create viewable forms and reports.” 142 For
example, the representative claim recited a data processing system “which has three
main components: a form file, a data file, and a viewer.”143 The claimed invention used
in-house form development tools to create and design the form file that can “model the
physical characteristics of an existing form, including the calculations and rule
conditions required to fill in the form.”144 Then, through an Aatrix Universal File
(“AUF”; that is, the data file), data from third-party applications could be “‘seamlessly
imported’ into the form file program to populate the form fields.”145 Eventually, the
viewer relied on the form file and the AUF together to calculate the data and further
allowed a user who creates a report by reviewing and changing the values in the form
fields.146

137

Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (alteration in
original) (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 73).
138
Id. (alteration in original and emphasis added and citations omitted).
139
Id. at 1124.
140
See id. at 1130.
141
Id. at 1123.
142
Aatrix Software, Inc., 882 F.3d at 1123.
143
Id. Claim 1 of the ‘615 Patent was representative and recited:
1. A data processing system for designing, creating, and importing data into, a viewable form
viewable by the user of the data processing system, comprising:
(a) a form file that models the physical representation of an original paper form and establishes
the calculations and rule conditions required to fill in the viewable form;
(b) a form file creation program that imports a background image from an original form, allows
a user to adjust and test-print the background image and compare the alignment of the original
form to the background test-print, and creates the form file;
(c) a data file containing data from a user application for populating the viewable form; and
(d) a form viewer program operating on the form file and the data file, to perform calculations,
allow the user of the data processing system to review and change the data, and create viewable
forms and reports.
Id. at 1123–24 (emphasis in original).
144
Id. at 1123.
145 Id.
146 Id.

[21:331:2021]

Federal Circuit’s Unconventionality Approach to
Patent-Ineligibility Challenges in a Motion to Dismiss

344

The Federal Circuit recognized the proposed second amended complaint as
supporting that the claimed date file, alone or in combination with other elements,
could be an inventive concept under step two.147 The Federal Circuit noted that those
new allegations “if accepted as true, contradict the district court’s conclusion that the
claimed combination was conventional or routine.” 148 Besides, the Federal Circuit
found that the proposed complaint contained concrete allegations supporting both that
“individual elements and the claimed combination are not well-understood, routine, or
conventional activity” and that the claimed combination improves the functioning of
the computer.149
The Federal Circuit focused its analysis on the “data file” limitation alleged as
“an improvement in the importation of data from third-party software applications.”150
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that the patentee had cited the specification to
support the related allegations concerning the improved data importation.151 On the
other hand, in responding to the defendant’s oral argument the Federal Circuit stated
that “this purported improvement in importation of data is in fact a routine and
conventional use of a computer,” and noted that the defendant “conceded that nothing
in the specification describes this importation of data as conventional.”152 Moreover,
the Federal Circuit discredited the district court’s finding that the “data file” limitation
was “a ‘well understood’ and ‘routine’ component and function of a computer[.]”153 The
Federal Circuit criticized that this finding was not grounded on any reasoning or
evidence nor supported by the record at the motion-to-dismiss stage.154 Therefore, the
Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in not permitting the patentee to file
the proposed second amended complaint.155
Unfortunately, the Aatrix Court did not explain a clear rule for determining
whether an inventive concept involves “more than performance of well-understood,
routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the industry.”156 The only
standard was whether the patentee had relied on the specification to make factual
allegations about the alleged inventive concept.157
D. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. ADP, L.L.C.
While the Amdocs decision indicates that family patents with shared or
overlapping specifications may pass the Alice standard together, Uniloc USA, Inc. v.
ADP, L.L.C. may show an opposite result.158 In Uniloc USA, Inc., U.S. Patent Nos.
147

Aatrix Software, Inc., 882 F.3d at 1126.
Id. at 1128.
149
Id. (emphasis added).
150
Id. at 1129.
151 Id.
152
Aatrix Software, Inc., 882 F.3d at 1129.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155
See id. at 1129–30.
156
See id. at 1128–30 (emphasis added).
157
See Aatrix Software, Inc., 882 F.3d at 1129 (“[The patentee] cites the specification as support for its argument
that the claimed data file contains an inventive concept directed to improved importation of data and interoperability
with third-party software.”).
158
See infra Part III.D.
148
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6,324,578 (“’578 Patent”), 6,510,466 (“’466 Patent”), 6,728,766 (“’766 Patent”), and
7,069,293 (“’293 Patent”) were allegedly infringed. 159 The patented technology
generally involved management of applications (or programs) on a computer network,
or a client-server environment, that includes a server supporting client stations.160
These four patents protected different aspects of the patented technology.161 The ’578
and ’766 Patents shared a common specification, while the ’466 and ’293 Patents
shared a common specification.162
The district court granted two motions to dismiss in separate decisions
partially because of the patent-ineligibility of the patents-in-suit.163 On appeal, the
Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss
based on the patent ineligibility of the ’293 and ’578 Patents, but affirmed the district
court’s dismissal with respect to the ’466 and ’766 Patents.164 Specifically, the Federal
Circuit found that the ’293 Patent passed step one without going through step two and
the ’578 Patent passed both step one and step two.165 On the other hand, the Federal
Circuit found that the ’466 and ’766 Patents failed the Alice two-step analysis.166
The ’578 Patent focused on “obtaining user and administrator sets of
configuration preferences for applications and then executing the applications using
both sets of obtained preferences.”167 The Federal Circuit considered the positioning of
the application launcher program on the client site and the configurable preferences
on the server together as an inventive concept.168 The Federal Circuit noted that “[t]he
positioning of these components on the application server together with the application
launcher on the client computer” allowed customized installation of applications based
Uniloc USA, Inc. v. ADP, L.L.C., 772 F. App’x 890, 892 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. AVG Techs. USA, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-00393-RWS (LEAD), 2017 WL 1154927, at
*1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2017).
161
See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. ADP, L.L.C., 279 F. Supp. 3d 736, 739 (E.D. Tex. 2017).
162 Id.
163
See Uniloc USA, Inc., 772 F. App’x at 892; AVG Techs. USA, Inc., 2017 WL 1154927, at *10; ADP, L.L.C.,
279 F. Supp. 3d at 751–52.
164
Uniloc USA, Inc., 772 F. App’x at 892.
165
Id. at 898–99.
166
Id. at 899–902.
167
ADP, L.L.C., 279 F. Supp. 3d at 740.
168
See Uniloc USA, Inc., 772 F. App’x at 898–99. The representative claim of the ’578 Patent was claim 1
reciting:
159
160

1. A method for management of configurable application programs on a network comprising the
steps of:
installing an application program having a plurality of configurable preferences and a plurality
of authorized users on a server coupled to the network;
distributing an application launcher program associated with the application program to a
client coupled to the network;
obtaining a user set of the plurality of configurable preferences associated with one of the
plurality of authorized users executing the application launcher program;
obtaining an administrator set of the plurality of configurable preferences from an
administrator; and
executing the application program using the obtained user set and the obtained administrator set
of the plurality of configurable preferences responsive to a request from the one of the plurality
of authorized users.
ADP, L.L.C., 279 F. Supp. 3d at 740 (emphasis added).
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on the administrator and user sets of preferences.169 Acknowledging that “[t]here has
been no showing or determination that such a network architecture was
conventional[,]”170 the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in finding claim
1 of the ’578 Patent patent-ineligible.171
The ’466 Patent related to “installing application software on the server and
providing instances of that software to the clients for execution.”172 According to the
patentee, the improvement provided by the claimed invention over the prior art was
achieved via “a user desktop interface that includes ‘display regions associated with
application programs for which the user is authorized.’”173 But, the Federal Circuit
found that the claimed display regions were “simply icons that execute programs.”174
In addition, the Federal Circuit noted that when the defendants contended that the
claimed display regions were “all conventional,” the patentee failed to “argue that the
display icons or the user desktop incorporate any unconventional software or perform
any unconventional functionality” or that “using an icon to access an application is in
any way unconventional.”175
Moreover, because of its view on the claimed user desktop interface, the
Federal Circuit disagreed with the patentee’s proposed inventive concept framed as the
ordered combination of “the various software limitations and their interaction” in the
disputed claims.176 The Federal Circuit criticized that “the ‘software limitations’ are
merely the conventional ones” and that “[t]here is nothing unconventional about the
[alleged] ‘ordered combination[.]’” 177 The Federal Circuit also opined that the district
court correctly found that the specification “describes the prior art client- application
server architecture, which necessarily includes a user interface, and allows
Uniloc USA, Inc., 772 F. App’x at 899.
Id.
(emphasis
added);
see
also
Cisco,
What
Is
Network
Architecture?,
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/enterprise-networks/what-is-network-architecture.html (last visited Dec. 8,
2020) (“Network architecture refers to the way network devices and services are structured to serve the connectivity
needs of client devices.”). Here, the positioning of the application launcher program on the client site and the
configurable preferences on the server is a kind of network architecture. See Uniloc USA, Inc., 772 F. App’x at 899.
171 Id.
172
AVG Techs. USA, Inc., 2017 WL 1154927, at *2.
173
Uniloc USA, Inc., 772 F. App’x at 899.
174 Id.
175
Id. at 899–900 (emphasis added).
176
See Uniloc USA, Inc., 772 F. App’x at 900. The representative claim of the ’466 Patent was claim 1 reciting:
169

170

1. A method for management of application programs on a network including a server and a
client comprising the steps of:
installing a plurality of application programs at the server;
receiving at the server a login request from a user at the client;
establishing a user desktop interface at the client associated with the user responsive to the login
request from the user, the desktop interface including a plurality of display regions associated
with a set of the plurality of application programs installed at the server for which the user is
authorized;
receiving at the server a selection of one of the plurality of application programs from the user
desktop interface; and
providing an instance of the selected one of the plurality of application programs to the client
for execution responsive to the selection.
AVG Techs. USA, Inc., 2017 WL 1154927, at *2 (emphasis added); see Uniloc USA, Inc., 772 F. App’x at 901.
177
Uniloc USA, Inc., 772 F. App’x at 900 (emphasis added).
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the transmission of an application program from a server to a client for installation.”178
Eventually, among other things, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
patent-ineligibility decision concerning the ’466 Patent.179
Lastly, the ’766 Patent involved “the management of licenses for the
application software” to maintain “license-related policies and information in the
client-server environment such that license availability can be communicated to clients
on a user-specific basis.”180 In deciding that there was no inventive concept in claim 1
of the ’766 Patent under step two,181 the Federal Circuit found that “[n]othing about
the licensing policy, the application server, or the notification of authorization is
asserted as unique or non-conventional from the way that those components ordinarily
function.” 182 Rather, the Federal Circuit concluded that the licensing policy, the
application server, and the authorization notification operated in a conventional way.
183 In addition, the Federal Circuit opined that “the real-time availability of
authorization information” alleged by the patentee as an inventive concept was merely
“a staple of a conventional network.” 184 Therefore, among other things, the Court
upheld the district court’s decision on the patent-ineligibility of the ’766 Patent.185
Like Bascom and Amdocs, the Uniloc Court did not define
“unconventionality.”186 Instead, the line between “conventional” and “unconventional”
was drawn by whether the specification has disclosed the elements of the claimed
inventive concept as conventional components.187 The Uniloc approach is similar to the
Aatrix approach.

178
Id. (citing AVG Techs. USA, Inc., 2017 WL 1154927, at *15); see also U.S. Patent No. 6,510,466 col.1 l.57
– col.2 l.11 (filed Dec. 14, 1998).
179
See Uniloc USA, Inc., 772 F. App’x at 900–01.
180
AVG Techs. USA, Inc., 2017 WL 1154927, at *2.
181
Uniloc USA, Inc., 772 F. App’x at 902. Claim 1 of the ’766 Patent was representative and recited:

1. A method for management of license use for a network comprising the steps of:
maintaining license management policy information for a plurality of application programs at a
license management server, the license management policy information including at least one
of a user identity based policy, an administrator policy override definition or a user policy
override definition;
receiving at the license management server a request for a license availability of a selected one
of the plurality of application programs from a user at a client;
determining the license availability for the selected one of the plurality of application programs
for the user based on the maintained license management policy information; and
providing an unavailability indication to the client responsive to the selection if the license
availability indicates that a license is not available for the user or an availability indication if the
licensed availability indicates that a license is available for the user.
AVG Techs. USA, Inc., 2017 WL 1154927, at *2 (emphasis added); see Uniloc USA, Inc., 772 F. App’x at 901.
182
Uniloc USA, Inc., 772 F. App’x at 902 (emphasis added).
183 Id.
184
Id. (emphasis added).
185
See id.
186
See id. at 899–902.
187
See Uniloc USA, Inc., 772 F App’x at 899–902.
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E. Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc.
In Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., the patented technology involved
“connecting a data capture device, e.g., a digital camera, to a mobile device so that a
user can automatically publish content from the data capture device to a website.”188
The Federal Circuit followed two legal propositions: (1) “[a]n inventive concept reflects
something more than the application of an abstract idea using ‘well-understood,
routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry’”189; and (2) “[i]f
a claim’s only ‘inventive concept’ is the application of an abstract idea using
conventional and well-understood techniques, the claim has not been transformed into
a patent-eligible application of an abstract idea.”190 The Federal Circuit considered the
patentee’s allegations as “identify[ing] several ways in which its application of
capturing, transferring, and publishing data was unconventional.”191 Eventually, the
Federal Circuit found the disputed claims patent-eligible under the step two
analysis.192
Before the patented technology was invented, “the conventional method for
publishing data and multimedia content on a website was time-consuming required
and manual user intervention[.]”193 As the ’794 Patent described, traditionally a user
takes a picture via, for instance, a digital camera and stores the picture on a memory
device of the camera.194 When the user decides to publish the picture onto a website,
she has to transfer the picture to a computer off-line by plugging, for example, a cable
such as a universal serial bus (“USB”) or a memory stick to the computer that then
uploads the picture onto the designated website.195 The ’794 Patent characterized this
traditional approach as manual uploading that “takes time and may be inconvenient
for the user.”196
To solve the problem, the patented technology utilized “a digital data capture
device in conjunction with a BluetoothTM (“BT”) enabled mobile device for publishing
data and multimedia content on one or more websites automatically or with minimal
user intervention[,]” where the data capture device is physically separated from the
mobile device. 197 The patented technology was protected by the ’794 Patent, ’752
Patent, ’698 Patent, and ’847 Patent, which shared the same specification.198
The disputed claims of the ’794 Patent included two independent claims, 1 and

188

Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 927 F.3d 1306, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1316 (quoting Aatrix Software, Inc., 882 F.3d at 1128).
190
Id. (quoting BSG Tech L.L.C. v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290–91 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
191
Id. (emphasis added).
192
Id. at 1319.
193
Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 3d 1138, 1144 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citing U.S. Patent No.
8,738,794 col.1, ll.38–47 (filed June 19, 2013)).
194
Cellspin Soft, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 3d at 1144; see U.S. Patent No. 8,738,794 col.1, ll.38–41 (filed June 19,
2013).
195
Cellspin Soft, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 3d at 1144; see U.S. Patent No. 8,738,794 col.1, ll.41–45 (filed June 19,
2013).
196
U.S. Patent No. 8,738,794 col.1 ll.45–47 (filed June 19, 2013); see Cellspin Soft, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 3d at
1144.
197
See U.S. Patent No. 8,738,794 col.1 ll.64–67 – col.2 ll.1–3 (filed June 19, 2013); see Cellspin Soft, Inc., 316
F. Supp. 3d at 1144.
198
Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1309.
189
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16, reciting the same subject matter.199 For instance, claim 1 had two features.200 The
first feature was referred to as “establishing a paired connection between the data
capture device and the mobile device before data is transmitted between the two.”201
The second feature included a step of detecting and signaling the new data for transfer
to the mobile device and a step of transferring the new data from the data capture
device to the mobile device.202

199
Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1310. Other disputed claims covered (1) claims 2–4, 7 and 9 (dependent claims
of claim 1) and (2) claims 17, 18, 20 and 21 (dependent claims of claim 16). See Cellspin Soft, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 3d
at 1145; see also U.S. Patent No. 8,738,794 cols.11–15 (filed June 19, 2013).
200
See Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1311. Claim 1 of the ’794 Patent recited:

1. A method for acquiring and transferring data from a Bluetooth enabled data capture device to
one or more web services via a Bluetooth enabled mobile device, the method comprising:
providing a software module on the Bluetooth enabled data capture device;
providing a software module on the Bluetooth enabled mobile device;
establishing a paired connection between the Bluetooth enabled data capture device and the
Bluetooth enabled mobile device;
acquiring new data in the Bluetooth enabled data capture device, wherein new data is data
acquired after the paired connection is established;
detecting and signaling the new data for transfer to the Bluetooth enabled mobile device, wherein
detecting and signaling the new data for transfer comprises:
determining the existence of new data for transfer, by the software module on the Bluetooth
enabled data capture device; and
sending a data signal to the Bluetooth enabled mobile device, corresponding to existence of new
data, by the software module on the Bluetooth enabled data capture device automatically, over
the established paired Bluetooth connection, wherein the software module on the Bluetooth
enabled mobile device listens for the data signal sent from the Bluetooth enabled data capture
device, wherein if permitted by the software module on the Bluetooth enabled data capture
device, the data signal sent to the Bluetooth enabled mobile device comprises a data signal and
one or more portions of the new data;
transferring the new data from the Bluetooth enabled data capture device to the Bluetooth
enabled mobile device automatically over the paired Bluetooth connection by the software
module on the Bluetooth enabled data capture device;
receiving, at the Bluetooth enabled mobile device, the new data from the Bluetooth enabled data
capture device;
applying, using the software module on the Bluetooth enabled mobile device, a user identifier
to the new data for each destination web service, wherein each user identifier uniquely identifies
a particular user of the web service;
transferring the new data received by the Bluetooth enabled mobile device along with a user
identifier to the one or more web services, using the software module on the Bluetooth enabled
mobile device;
receiving, at the one or more web services, the new data and user identifier from the Bluetooth
enabled mobile device, wherein the one or more web services receive the transferred new data
corresponding to a user identifier; and
making available, at the one or more web services, the new data received from the Bluetooth
enabled mobile device for public or private consumption over the internet, wherein one or more
portions of the new data correspond to a particular user identifier.
Id. at 1310–11 (emphasis in original).
201
Id. at 1310–11 (emphasis in original).
202
See Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1311 (citing U.S. Patent No. 8,738,794 col.12, ll.1–2 (filed June 19,
2013)). The second feature was referred to as a “push mode.” Id. On the other hand, claim 16 utilized a “pull mode.”
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Regarding the ’752 Patent, the asserted claims covered two subject matters: (1)
“a method for transferring data from a Bluetooth enabled data capture device to a
remote internet server via a Bluetooth enabled mobile device” (claim 1 and its
dependent claims 2 and 4-5); and (2) “a method for transferring data to a remote
internet server by a Bluetooth enabled mobile device” (claim 12 and its dependent
claims 13 and 14).203 Claim 1 of the ’752 Patent was allegedly different.204 Although
claim 1 of the ’752 Patent was similar to claim 1 of the ’794 Patent,205 the Federal
Circuit identified two different features.206 First, the mobile device and data capture
device were connected by using a cryptographic encryption key. 207 Second, the
hypertext transfer protocol (“HTTP”) was implemented for data transmission.208
Regarding the ’698 Patent, the disputed claims included four independent
claims reciting four subject matters. 209 Claim 1 recited “a machine-implemented
Id. (citing U.S. Patent No. 8,738,794 col.14, ll.30–35 (filed June 19, 2013)). The “pull mode”-related limitations
included:
detecting the new data for transfer to the Bluetooth enabled mobile device, wherein detecting
the new data for transfer comprises:
polling the Bluetooth enabled data capture device using the software module on the Bluetooth
enabled mobile device over the established paired Bluetooth connection, wherein the Bluetooth
enabled data capture device listens for the polling request sent from the Bluetooth enabled
mobile device; and
determining the existence of new data for transfer, by the software module on the Bluetooth
enabled data capture device[.]
See U.S. Patent No. 8,738,794 claim 16.
203
Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1311; see U.S. Patent No. 8,892,752 cols.11–14 (filed June 4, 2014).
204
Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1311. The patentee did not treat claims 12–14 of the ’752 Patent differently
from claim 1 of the ’794 Patent in terms of the patent-eligibility analysis. See id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207
Id. (citing U.S. Patent No. 8,892,752 col.11, ll.54–56 (filed June 4, 2014)). The related limitation recited
“establishing a secure paired Bluetooth connection between the Bluetooth enabled data capture device and the
Bluetooth enabled mobile device, wherein the secure paired Bluetooth connection uses a cryptographic encryption
key[.]” U.S. Patent No. 8,892,752 col.11, ll.52–56 (filed June 4, 2014) (emphasis added).
208
Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1311 (citing U.S. Patent No. 8,892,752 col.12 ll.16–36 (filed June 4, 2014)).
The related limitation recited:
transferring the encrypted data from the Bluetooth enabled data capture device to the Bluetooth
enabled mobile device, over the established secure paired Bluetooth connection, wherein the
Bluetooth enabled mobile device has access to the internet, wherein the Bluetooth enabled
mobile device is configured to receive the encrypted data and obtain the new data from the
encrypted data using the cryptographic encryption key, wherein the Bluetooth enabled mobile
device is configured to attach a user identifier, an action setting and a destination web address
of a remote internet server to the obtained new data, wherein the user identifier uniquely
identifies a particular user of internet service provided by the remote internet server, wherein
action setting comprises one of a remote procedure call (RPC) method and hypertext transfer
protocol (HTTP) method, and wherein the Bluetooth enabled mobile device is configured to send
the obtained new data with the attached user identifier, an action setting and a destination web
address to a remote internet server.
U.S. Patent No. 8,892,752 col.12, ll.17–37 (filed June 4, 2014) (emphasis added).
209
See Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1311. Claims 1, 3–5, 7-8, 10–13 and 15–20 were allegedly infringed. Id.
Claims 1, 5, 8 and 13 were independent claims. See U.S. Patent No. 9,258,698 cols.11–14 (filed Nov. 5, 2014).
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method of media transfer.”210 Claim 5 recited “a short-range wireless enabled digital
camera device” implemented by the method of claim 1.211 Claim 8 recited “a system for
transferring media,” but contained essentially the same limitations of claim 5. 212
Finally, claim 13 recited “a non-transitory computer-readable medium” essentially
used for executing the method of claim 1.213
Lastly, the ’847 Patent included claim 1 with limitations also similar to the
limitations in claim 1 of the ’752 Patent.214 But, claim 1 of the ’847 Patent was a system
claim with two different features.215 The first feature was a Bluetooth enabled data
capture device that cryptographically authenticates the identity of a Bluetooth enabled
cellular phone before connecting the phone and transmitting data. 216 The second
feature was a mobile application that listens for the event notification sent from the
data capture device and corresponding to the acquired new-data and utilizes HTTP to
transfer the new-data to a website over the cellular data network.217
210

See U.S. Patent No. 9,258,698 cols.11–12 (filed Nov. 5, 2014). Claims 3 and 4 were dependent on claim 1.

See id.
211
U.S. Patent No. 9,258,698 col.12; see also Cellspin Soft, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 3d at 1146. Claims 7, 17 and 19
were dependent claims of claim 5. See U.S. Patent No. 9,258,698 cols. 12, 13, 16. The patentee singled out claim 5
for a separate patent-eligibility argument. Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1311. Unlike the ’794 Patent and ’752 Patent,
claim 5 of the ’698 Patent specifically recited a “digital camera” that communicates with a cellular phone through
“short-range wireless” signals, rather than reciting a generic data capture device with Bluetooth enablement. See id.
at 1311–12. Otherwise, claim 5 included limitations similar to the limitations of claim 1 of the ’752 Patent. Id. at
1312.
212
See U.S. Patent No. 9,258,698 cols.12–14. Claims 10, 12 and 20 were dependent claims of claim 8. See id.
at cols.13, 14, 16.
213
See U.S. Patent No. 9,258,698 cols.11, 12, 14, 15. Claims 15, 16 and 18 depended on claim 13. See id. at
cols.15, 16.
214
Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1312.
215
See id.
216
Id. (citing U.S. Patent No. 9,749,847 col.12, ll.14–25 (filed Dec. 19, 2014)). The related limitation recited:

a first Bluetooth communication device configured to establish a paired Bluetooth wireless
connection between the Bluetooth enabled data capture device and a Bluetooth enabled cellular
phone, wherein the Bluetooth enabled data capture device is configured to cryptographically
authenticate identity of the Bluetooth enabled cellular phone when the first Bluetooth
communication device establishes the paired Bluetooth wireless connection[.]
U.S. Patent No. 9,749,847 col.12, ll.17–25 (filed Dec. 19, 2014) (emphasis added).
Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1312 (citing U.S. Patent No. 9,749,847 col.12 ll.42–51, 62–67 (filed Dec. 19,
2014)). The related limitation recited:
217

a mobile application in the Bluetooth enabled cellular phone comprising executable instructions
that, when executed by a second processor inside the Bluetooth enabled cellular phone controls
the second processor to:
detect and receive the acquired new-data, comprising:
listen for the event notification, sent from the Bluetooth enabled data capture device, over the
established paired Bluetooth wireless connection, wherein the event notification corresponds to
the acquired new-data; and
receive the event notification and the acquired new-data, from the Bluetooth enabled data
capture device, …;
store the new-data received over the established paired Bluetooth wireless connection, …; and
use HTTP to transfer the new-data received over the established paired Bluetooth wireless
connection, along with user information stored in the second memory device of the
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit focused on analyzing the ’794 Patent218 because
the district court treated the ’794 Patent as a representative of all other patents.219 The
Federal Circuit agreed that the disputed claims were directed to an abstract idea and
characterized it as the broad idea of “capturing and transmitting data from one device
to another.”220 However, the Federal Circuit found that the patentee’s complaint
included statements showing “why aspects of its claimed inventions were not
conventional, e.g., its two-step, two-device structure requiring a connection before data
is transmitted.” 221 The Federal Circuit acknowledged the patentee’s view on the
inventive concept of the claim invention. 222 In general, the claimed inventiveness
covered a two-step, two-device structure requiring a data-capturing step and a datapublishing step performed in two different devices between which a paired connection
is established before data is transmitted via HTTP from one device to the other
device.223
Like Bascom and Amdocs, the Cellspin Court did not describe what constitutes
“unconventionality.”224 Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit illustrated other aspects of the
claimed inventive concept when it responded to the defendant’s arguments.225
First, regarding the defendant’s allegation that the disputed claims simply
“replace a USB or similar cable with Bluetooth[,]” the Federal Circuit noted that “even
assuming that Bluetooth was conventional at the time of these inventions,
implementing a well-known technique with particular devices in a specific combination,
like the two-device structure here, can be inventive.” 226 The Federal Circuit
emphasized that when describing the inventiveness of the claimed inventions, the
patentee “did more than simply label techniques as inventive.”227 Rather, the patentee
“pointed to evidence suggesting that these techniques had not been implemented in a
similar way.”228 For example, the patentee alleged that “[i]t was not until 2009 or later
when the leading tech companies, such as Facebook and Google, started releasing
HTTP APIs for developers to utilize a HTTP transfer protocol for mobile devices.”229
Therefore, the Federal Circuit concluded that it is sufficiently to say that the patentee
“has claimed significantly more than the idea of capturing, transferring, or publishing
data.”230
Second, when rejecting the defendant’s argument that the claimed inventive
elements “amount to nothing more than minor variations in the technological
cryptographically authenticated Bluetooth enabled cellular phone, to the website, over the
cellular data network[.]
U.S. Patent No. 9,749,847 col.12, ll.42–51, 62–67 (filed Dec. 19, 2014) (emphasis added).
218
See Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1315–17.
219
Cellspin Soft, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 3d at 1155; see Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1313.
220
Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1315.
221
Id. at 1317–18 (emphasis added).
222
See id. at 1316–17.
223
See id. at 1316–19.
224
See id. at 1316–17.
225
See Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1318–19.
226
Id. at 1318.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229
Id. at 1319.
230
Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1319.
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environment in which the abstract ideas are implemented[,]” the Federal Circuit
compared Electric Power Group, L.L.C. v. Alstom S.A.231 with the present case.232 The
Federal Circuit characterized Electric Power Group, L.L.C. as a case of “merely
applying an abstract idea to a “particular technological environment” to an extent that
such application “was not enough to transform the underlying idea into something
patent eligible[,]” as opposed to the present case where the disputed “claims that use
an environment—a computer, a mobile phone, etc.—to do significantly more than
simply carry out an abstract idea are patent eligible.” 233 Specifically, the Federal
Circuit found that the asserted claims here “recite[d] a specific, plausibly inventive
way of arranging devices and using protocols rather than the general idea of capturing,
transferring, and publishing data.”234
IV. NATURE OF THE UNCONVENTIONALITY APPROACH
A. What Constitutes Unconventionality
In BSG Tech L.L.C. v. Buyseasons, Inc., the Federal Circuit criticized that the
patentee did not “argue that other, non-abstract features of the claimed inventions,
alone or in combination, are not well-understood, routine and conventional database
structures and activities.”235 Recently, the Federal Circuit in Bridge and Post, Inc. v.
Verizon Communications, Inc. questioned that the patentee did not “argue that any
individual limitation of the [disputed] patent is unconventional or non-routine.”236 But,
the question is what constitutes unconventionality.
While the Federal Circuit is yet to provide the contours of “unconventionality”
that an inventive concept requires, Aatrix and Cellspin together may guide us to
identify what is unconventional in an inventive concept.237 What these two decisions
looked for is specifically helpful for patentees to make successful allegations in a
complaint or for patent drafters to describe patent-eligible innovation in a specification.
1. Software-Based Innovation: Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software,
Inc.
In the proposed second amended complaint, the allegations that the Aatrix
Court considered as true showed that “individual elements and the claimed
combination are not well-understood, routine, or conventional activity.” 238 These
allegations may help define “unconventionality” for software-based innovation in two
aspects. First, the claimed invention must process data differently from prior art
technology. For example, the complaint stated that the claimed invention “allow[ed]
231

Elec. Power Grp., L.L.C. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
See Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1319.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235
BSG Tech L.L.C. v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (emphasis added).
236
Bridge & Post, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 778 F. App’x 882, 884 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (emphasis added).
237
See infra Part IV.A.
238
Aatrix Software, Inc., 882 F.3d at 1128–30.
232
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data to be imported into the viewable electronic form from outside applications[,]” as
opposed to “[p]rior art forms solutions [that] allowed data to be extracted only from
widely available databases with published database schemas, not the proprietary data
structures of application software.”239
Second, the claimed invention must improve the functionality of a system that
implements it. For instance, the complaint in Aatrix Software, Inc. described that the
claimed invention “in-creased the efficiencies of computers processing tax forms” and
“saved storage space both in the users’ computers’ RAM (Random Access Memory,
which is fast, short-term storage used by running programs) and hard disk (permanent
slower storage used for files and programs when not running).”240
2. Equipment-Based Innovation: Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc.
The allegations that the Cellspin Court accepted as true may define
“unconventionality” for equipment-based innovation in three aspects. First, a system
implementing the claimed invention must operate differently from prior art systems.241 For
example, the amended complaint described prior art devices as an “inferior” system
requiring “a [data] capture device with built in mobile wireless Internet,” such that the
data capture device was “bulky, expensive in terms of hardware, and expensive in
terms of requiring a user to purchase an extra and/or separate cellular service for the
data capture device.”242 On the other hand, the amended complaint characterized the
claimed unconventional system as a “two-step, two-device structure[,]” so as to enable
the claimed invention to perform a data-capturing step and data-publishing step
separately in “different device[s] linked via a wireless, paired connection.”243
Second, the claimed invention must provide benefits derived from the claimed
unconventional system.244 For example, the amended complaint asserted at least four
benefits: (1) the data capture device “only needs to serve one core function—capturing
data—and does not need to incorporate other hardware and software components that
might be needed to store data or publish it onto the Internet”; (2) such components for
storing or publishing data can be placed on a user’s mobile device, such that “data
capture devices [would] be smaller and cheaper to build”; (3) using data capture devices
would be simpler because, for instance, “one mobile device with one data plan controls
several data capture devices”; and (4) “uploading data via a separate device, wirelessly
paired to the data capture device, allows users to access and upload data even if the
capture device is physically inaccessible to the user.”245
Third, the claimed invention must contain a specific feature operating
differently from prior art technology. 246 For instance, the amended complaint in
239

Id. at 1127 (emphasis added).
Id.
See Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1316.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244
See id. at 1316–17 (“Cellspin also alleged that this structure provided various benefits over prior art
systems.”).
245
Id. at 1317 (emphasis aadded).
246
See Cellspin Soft, Inc., 927 F.3d at 1317 (“Cellspin also alleged that its specific ordered combination of
elements was inventive.”).
240
241
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Cellspin Soft, Inc. compared prior art devices and the claimed inventions by focusing
on the former device capable of forwarding “data to a mobile device as captured[,]”
while the latter device “require[d] establishing a paired connection between the mobile
device and the data capture device before data is transmitted.” 247 This inventive
feature was allegedly to ensure “that data is only transmitted if the mobile device is
capable of receiving it.”248 Additionally, the amended complaint alleged “its use of
HTTP, by an ‘intermediary device’ and while the data is ‘in transit,’ as being inventive”
and “non-existent” prior to the claim invention.249 All these stated features led the
Cellspin Court to conclude that the patentee had “alleged that [the claimed invention’s]
specific ordered combination of elements was inventive.”250
B. An Approach Unlike Novelty
In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., the Supreme
Court recognized that “in evaluating the significance of additional steps, the § 101
patent-eligibility inquiry and, say, the § 102 novelty inquiry might sometimes
overlap.”251 There, the Court considered whether “any additional steps consist of wellunderstood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific
community[,]” such that “those steps, when viewed as a whole, add nothing significant
beyond the sum of their parts taken separately” and, therefore, “are not sufficient to
transform unpatentable natural correlations into patentable applications of those
regularities.”252 One commentator has questioned that the Mayo approach was “a de
facto exercise of searching for novelty, or non-obviousness in a subset of the claims.”253
However, the Mayo Court noted “that need not always be so.”254
The Federal Circuit case law has shown that its unconventionality approach is
not merely a search for novelty.255 Prior to Cellspin Soft, Inc., the Federal Circuit in
ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect held that “adding novel or non-routine components
is not necessarily enough to survive a § 101 challenge.” 256 The Federal Circuit
emphasized that a claimed inventive concept “must be ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more’ than a patent on the abstract idea.”257
With that, the Federal Circuit disagreed that the patentee had “presented sufficient
factual allegations to preclude dismissal at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage” by specifically
247

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
249
See id.
250 Id.
251
Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 90.
252
Id. at 79–80.
253
Kristy J. Downing, Esq., Patent Eligibility’s Doctrinal Exclusions . . . Lately, A Scary Movie Too Difficult to
Watch: Concrete Solutions and Suggestions, 22 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 231, 270–71 (2018); see also Andrew
Kanel, The Federal Circuit’s Treatment of Rule 12 Dismissals for Lack of Patent Eligible Subject Matter, 53 AKRON
L. REV. 1053, 1065 (2019) (“The eligibility analysis of Mayo does overlap with the novelty inquiry under § 102 when
evaluating whether additional steps are well-known, routine, or conventional.”).
254
Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 90.
255
See infra Part IV.B.
256
ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 773 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu,
L.L.C., 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
257
Id. (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 72–73).
248

[21:331:2021]

Federal Circuit’s Unconventionality Approach to
Patent-Ineligibility Challenges in a Motion to Dismiss

356

arguing that “its patents represent an unconventional solution to technological
problems in the field, and thus contain an inventive concept.”258
The patented technology in ChargePoint, Inc. related to the operation of
multiple charging stations for electric vehicles.259 Four disputed patents, U.S. Patent
Nos. 7,956,570 (“’570 Patent”), 8,138,715 (“’715 Patent”), 8,432,131 (“’131 Patent”), and
8,450,967 (“’967 Patent”), shared the same specification and protected the claimed
invention in four aspects. 260 Briefly, the claimed invention provided “networked
charging stations” subject to “network connectivity [that] allows the stations to be
managed from a central location, allow[ing] drivers to locate charging stations in
advance, and allows all users to interact intelligently with the electricity grid.”261 But,
the Federal Circuit held that all disputed claims were “directed to the abstract idea of
communicating over a network for device interaction.”262
Under step two of the Alice standard, the Federal Circuit held that the claimed
inventive concept was the abstract idea itself. 263 In responding to the patentee’s
argument that the disputed “patents claim charging stations enabled to use networks,
not the network connectivity itself[,]” 264 the Federal Circuit criticized that “the
specification gives no indication that the patented invention involved how to add
network connectivity to these charging stations in an unconventional way.”265 Rather,
the Federal Circuit noted that the disputed claims and specification showed that “it is
clear that network communication is the only possible inventive concept.”266 Actually,
the Federal Circuit acknowledged that the patentee had identified the technical
problems and an unconventional way to solve the problems.267 However, the Federal
Circuit opined that although “the alleged ‘inventive concept’ that solves problems
identified in the field is that the charging stations are network-controlled[,] network
control is the abstract idea itself[.]”268 Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
disputed claims were patent-ineligible.269
Unlike the plaintiff’s allegations recognized by the Cellspin Court, the alleged
unconventional solution in ChargePoint, Inc. did not touch how the claimed invention
utilizes network control differently from the traditional network control technology.270
Instead, the patentee in ChargePoint, Inc. focused on the claimed network control itself
by pointing out three features: “(a) the ability to turn electric supply on based on
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Id. at 763.
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Id. at 764. The asserted claims of the ’715 Patent covered an apparatus controlled by a remote server that
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electricity flow based on demand response communications sent by the server. Id. The disputed method claims of the
’967 Patent “related to using the network-controlled charging stations [with] the idea of demand response.” Id. Lastly,
the asserted claims of the ’570 Patent covered a network-controlled, charging station system. Id.
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communications from a remote server; (b) a ‘network-controlled’ charging system; and
(c) a charging station that receives communication from a remote server, including
communications made to implement a demand response policy.”271
Therefore, ChargePoint and Cellspin together indicate that the
unconventionality approach is not a novelty test. The unconventionality approach
requires a patentee to describe not only the claimed inventive concept, but also prior
art technology intended to be improved.272 However, the unconventionality approach is
different from the novelty analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 102, which requires a prior art
reference to disclose “all the claimed limitations arranged or combined in the same way
as in the claim.”273 By contrast, the unconventionality approach does not focus on
whether all limitations of a claim have been disclosed by alleged prior art technology.274
Rather, a patentee/applicant must compare the claimed inventive concept and prior
art technology by explaining how they operate differently.275
V. CONCLUSION
The case law concerning patent-eligibility analysis indicates that whether an
alleged inventive concept exists depends on whether the claimed limitations,
individual or as an order combination, are well-understood, routine, conventional
activities. The Federal Circuit in several cases has adopted the unconventionality
approach. However, the Federal Circuit has not defined what constitutes an
unconventional feature of the claimed inventive concept. Nevertheless, Aatrix and
Cellspin together may suggest a guideline for lower courts or practitioners to follow. A
patent specification or a patentee’s complaint must include four topics. The first topic
is prior art technology. The second topic explains how a system executing the claimed
invention performs differently from the prior art technology. The third topic covers the
benefits derived from the claimed unconventional system. Finally, the fourth topic
describes a specific feature in the claimed invention as being operated differently from
the prior art technology. With these factual statements taken together, a patent may
survive a patent-ineligibility challenge in a motion to dismiss.
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